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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relationship between government quality and regional economic growth in 206 
EU-28 regions during the period 2010-2017. We use the European Quality of Government Index (EQI), 
based on the pillars of quality, impartiality and corruption and provide results for both the aggregated 
index and its three components. We find a negative evolution of government quality across regions over 
the studied period. Overall, the econometric results, obtained via Ordinary Least Squares and Spatial Lag 
models suggest that improvements in the quality of government positively contribute to economic growth, 
although larger impacts are found for EU-15 regions in comparison with regions from countries that 
joined the European Union after 2004. Finally, we find that spatial spillovers matter, as a great proportion 
of the effect of government quality on growth is indirect. In that regard, when analyzing different 
components of government quality in the spatial models, a clear influence is found for corruption and 
impartiality, whereas results are weaker for the quality of public services.  
Keywords: Government quality; Regional growth; Spatial spillovers. 
JEL classification: O43; R11; R50. 
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Resumen: 
Este trabajo investiga la relación entre la calidad de gobierno y el crecimiento económico regional en 206 
regiones de la UE-28 durante el período 2010-2017. Utilizamos el Índice Europeo de Calidad de Gobierno 
(EQI), basado en los pilares de calidad, imparcialidad y corrupción, y proporcionamos resultados tanto 
para el índice agregado como para sus tres componentes. Encontramos una evolución negativa de la calidad 
de gobierno en las regiones durante el período estudiado. En general, los resultados econométricos, 
obtenidos mediante Mínimos Cuadrados Ordinarios y modelos de retardo espacial sugieren que las 
mejoras en la calidad de gobierno contribuyen positivamente al crecimiento económico, aunque se 
identifican mayores impactos para las regiones de la UE-15 en comparación con las regiones de los países 
que se incorporaron a la Unión Europea después de 2004. Finalmente, los efectos de contagio espacial son 
importantes, ya que una gran proporción del efecto de la calidad de gobierno en el crecimiento es indirecto. 
En este sentido, al analizar los diferentes componentes de la calidad de gobierno en los modelos espaciales, 
se encuentra una influencia clara para la corrupción y la imparcialidad, mientras que los resultados son 
más débiles para la calidad de los servicios públicos.  
Palabras clave: Calidad de gobierno; Crecimiento regional; Efectos de desbordamiento espacial. 
Clasificación JEL: O43; R11; R50. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal papers by North (1990) and Edquist (1997) there is a wide consensus on the idea 
that institutional quality—or quality of government—matters for economic and social progress. In this 
vein, the European Union (EU) has engaged quality of institutions as a mean of reduction of regional 
socio-economic disparities. Following the Copenhagen criteria from 2004,1 any European state embracing 
the values of freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as a well-
functioning market economy, may apply to join the EU. In 2017, the EU Commission recognized tackling 
widespread corruption and introducing measures aimed at making government decisions more efficient 
and transparent to be as important as physical investment for regional development (EU Commission, 
2017). Accordingly, the implementation of institutional reforms aimed at improving institutional quality 
can be a valuable tool for regional development strategies.2 
Several empirical works have found a positive link between institutional quality and economic 
performance (e.g. Gwartney et al., 1999; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Lundstrom, 2005). In particular, the 
protection of property rights and rule of law are especially relevant in generating sustainable growth 
(Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2005). Nevertheless, despite the abundance of contributions at the 
country level, or recent studies for particular countries (see Choi, 2018; Quah, 2017), not as many results 
have been yet delivered addressing regional level analyses on the issue (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Some 
exceptions are found for the European regional context, on which this paper focuses. Crescenzi et al. 
(2016) found a strong positive relationship between the quality of regional institutions and the returns of 
infrastructural investments. More similar to the context of our research, Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo 
(2015) disclose local institutional quality to be a vital factor in determining the rate of returns of Cohesion 
Policy investments. Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose (2018) found a positive link between institutions and 
growth for the period 1995-2009 but considered only EU-15 regions. Nonetheless, the topic has become 
even more important after the latest EU enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013, which have remarkably 
increased development disparities across the Union. Moreover, the new members have institutional quality 
standards generally below the EU average, as their institutions might be still influenced by the pre-
transition institutions, when these countries were ruled by a planned system. 
This paper revisits the topic, but differs in several aspects from previous contributions, attempting 
to provide fresh evidence on this literature. First, it uses a broader and more updated dataset covering the 
period 2010-2017, including EU-153 regions and regions from countries that joined the EU after 20044, 
which might be relevant given the great disparities between these two groups. To date, most of the existent 
evidence at the regional level corresponds to the pre-crisis years, and it is generally confined to EU-15 
regions. Second, we make use of the most recent edition of the European Quality of Government Index 
(EQI, see Charron et al. 2016; 2019), available for years 2010, 2013 and 2017. In contrast to previous 
regional analyses mostly relying on a single observation of institutional quality, we are able to analyze its 
recent evolution by using information from the three years. Charron et al. (2019) introduced the new 
wave of the EQI index but, to the best of our knowledge, empirical analyses making an effective use of the 
three waves are still yet to come. Third, we provide a disaggregated analysis for the government quality 
components, namely quality, impartiality and corruption, which entails the opportunity of delivering 
more accurate policy implications from the results. Fourth, we address the spatial relationship between 
government quality and economic growth and quantify the spillover effects.  
                                                            
1 The criteria were introduced just before allowing for the entrance of Eastern and Central European countries into the EU, when 
these countries were in transition from an authoritarian regime based on a centralized economy to democracy and free market.  
2 In that regard, papers such as Basyal et al. (2018) attempted to find whether some particular institutional actions might improve 
government quality by reducing corruption levels. 
3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom. 
4 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Based on the previous evidence for Europe and other geographical contexts, we expect a positive 
relationship between quality of government and economic growth. Also, spatial spillovers are remarkable 
in European regions (see Ezcurra and Rios, 2019). We therefore expect a notable role of the space in our 
context. Our results widely support these hypotheses. However, there are some interesting nuances: i) 
quality of government effects on growth are larger for the EU-15 regions; and ii) generally, clearer effects 
are found for the components of impartiality and corruption, whereas the effects of the quality component 
are weaker or non-significant in most models. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the theoretical 
foundations and review the relevant literature. The dataset and the descriptive statistics are presented in 
Section 3. The econometric strategy is described in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the main results 
and, finally, the conclusions and policy implications are summarized in Section 6.   
2. Literature review 
The influence of institutions on economic development was fundamentally neglected by the 
mainstream of the economic theory until the nineties. Indeed, the Neoclassical growth models by Solow 
(1956), as well as the endogenous growth approach developed by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), 
considered economic growth as the result of the mere combination of physical capital, labor, technology 
and knowledge.  
North (1990) suggested that formal institutions matter for economic development, insofar as 
transactions among individuals in a society are costly. Institutions can be understood as the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. 
Coherently, the major role of institutions would be that of reducing uncertainty by establishing a stable 
structure for human cooperation. In this prospective, institutions are bound to influence economic 
performance as they are capable of reducing transaction costs. Therefore, good institutional settings 
promote economic development by establishing an environment in which transactions take place under 
trust and order. Property rights are well-established, and people do not need to devote too many resources 
to their control and enforcement.   
Building on North, numerous studies have highlighted that poor institutional quality makes the 
economic environment less efficient, entailing lower economic standards. Countries with high corruption, 
weak rule of law, and low impartiality are associated with, among others, poorer health (Holmberg and 
Rothstein, 2012), worse environmental outcomes (Welsch, 2004), greater income inequality (Gupta et al. 
2002), and even lower levels of happiness (Veenhoven, 2010). Similarly, and more directly addressing our 
research question, examples of studies reporting a significant relationship between institutional quality and 
income per capita or income growth include Knack and Keefer (1995), Gwartney et al. (1999), de Haan 
and Sturm (2000) or Lundstrom (2005). Holmberg et al. (2009) reported positive effects of institutional 
quality on several welfare dimensions and Mo (2001) found a negative effect of corruption on income 
growth. There are several mechanisms. First, corruption is associated with less efficiency in the use of the 
available resources and in the provision of government services because of more inefficient regulations. 
Moreover, corruption might favor particular elites or social actors, widening economic and social 
disparities.  
Focusing on the European regional context, Crescenzi et al. (2016) study the link between the 
quality of regional institutions and the rates of returns of infrastructural investments using data for 166 
regions between 1995 and 2009. Their research concludes that better institutions lead to higher returns 
of investment and economic development. Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2014) examine the impact of 
institutional quality on regions’ innovative performance in a sample of 189 EU regions between 1997 and 
2009, concluding that there is an institutional quality threshold effect for innovation.  Accordingly, 
policies aimed at improving innovative performance are more likely to be effective in regions where insti-
tutional quality is sufficiently high. Nistotskaya et al. (2015) argue that regions where governments are 
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perceived as impartial and free from corruption enjoy a more dynamic economic environment. These 
effects are found for a sample of 172 regions from 18 EU countries between 1990 and 2007. More recently, 
Ezcurra and Rios (2019) reported evidence from the last Great Recession, and positively linked quality of 
government with regional resilience. 
More empirical evidence comes from recent studies for the Italian regional context. Lasagni et al. 
(2015) test the relevance of institutional quality in explaining firm productivity in 107 Italian provinces 
for the period 1998-2007, finding a key role for the local institutional context. Di Berardino et al. (2019) 
find that within-country human capital movements are modifying institutional quality, exacerbating the 
North-South divide in Italy. Coppola et al. (2018) conclude that, whereas quality of government has no 
implications for EU funds, it increases the impact of subsidies received by firms. Considering a cross-
regional European sample, Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) analyze the relationship between insti-
tutional quality and the rates of returns of Cohesion Policy investments for a sample of 169 regions for 
the period 1996-2007, concluding that both EU investments and institutional quality make a difference 
for regional growth. Additionally, above a certain threshold of expenditure in investments, the quality of 
institutions becomes the basic factor determining regional growth rates.  
From a theoretical point of view, D’agostino and Scarlato (2015) show a positive link between 
institutional quality and regional economic performance by constructing a three-sector semi-endogenous 
growth model with negative externalities related to the social and institutional variables affecting the 
innovative capacity of regional economic systems. Particularly, by applying their model to the Italian 
regions, they find the enhancement of socio-institutional conditions to be more effective for innovation 
capacity and economic growth in the lowest-ranked regions in terms of institutional and economic 
development.  
Lastly, as regions are not isolated economic units, spatial spillovers are likely to be important in this 
context. In this vein, Bologna et al. (2016) show that gains from institutional reforms are not confined to 
the metropolitan area in which the reforms are enacted, being the effects noticeable in the neighboring 
regions too. 
3. Empirical framework 
3.1. The sample 
The sample consists of 206 NUTS5 2 European regions from the EU-28. These territorial units are 
particularly meaningful from a policy perspective as they generally have considerable responsibilities in 
terms of policy competences, although this varies from one country to another. Throughout the analysis, 
particular attention will be devoted to the large heterogeneity that characterizes the EU regional economic 
development and institutional quality standards. To this purpose, two subgroups of regions will be 
compared: i) regions belonging to countries that were members of the EU prior to the enlargement of 
2004 will be referred to as EU-15; ii) regions from countries that joined the EU after that year will be 
labelled as NMS (New Member States). In the sample, there are 149 EU-15 regions and 57 NMS regions. 
The dataset covers the period 2010-2017. Such reduced time span was selected due to data constrains in 
government quality, as the first edition of the EQI index corresponds to 2010.  
 
                                                            
5 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic 
territory of the EU for the following purposes: i) Collection, development and harmonization of European regional statistics; ii) 
Socio-economic regional analysis; iii) Framing of EU regional policies. In particular, the NUTS 1 level represents major socio-
economic areas, the NUTS 2 level corresponds to basic regions for the application of regional policies and the NUTS 3 level are 
small regions for specific diagnoses. 
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3.2. Variables, sources and descriptive statistics  
As a dependent variable, we use the growth of regional income per inhabitant, expressed in purchas-
ing power standards (PPS), taken from Eurostat. This indicator has the advantage of allowing for 
meaningful comparisons of income by avoiding biases due to discrepancies in purchasing power across 
European regions. Table 1 summarizes some descriptive statistics for the entire period. The table discloses 
remarkable differences in both the average GDP per capita and growth rates. As expected, GDP per capita 
was lower for NMS regions over the studied period; in contrast, they grew faster than the EU-15 group, 
although disparities between the two groups reduced only slightly.  
Government quality is proxied by the European Quality of Government Index (EQI), developed by 
the Quality of Government Institute - University of Gothenburg (see Charron et al., 2014, 2016, 2019). 
Data are currently available for years 2010, 2013 and 2017. The EQI index is especially appealing for 
analyses at the regional level in the European context, as it is based on the same territorial aggregation than 
most of EU regional statistics, which makes it totally compatible with the information provided by the 
European Statistical Office (Eurostat) and with the European Regional Policy.6 
The index defines institutional quality as a multi-dimensional concept consisting of three compo-
nents: quality of public services, impartiality and corruption. Specifically, quality and impartiality of 
regional governments are made out of residents’ ratings of these two characteristics in the areas of public 
education and health care system, as well as in law enforcement and in the democratic procedures. Analo-
gously, residents’ perceptions and experiences with bribery define the indicator for control of corruption. 
Then, the three components are aggregated to construct a composite index. All the methodological details 
can be found in the seminal papers by Charron et al. (2014, 2016, 2019), as well as in the Database 
Codebook, available online.  
The original index ranges from -3 to +3, with greater values representing greater government quality. 
With the aim of simplifying the interpretation of the estimates in the econometric models, we take the 
min-max normalized values of the variable, which range from 0 to 1,7 also provided by the database. 
Unfortunately, EQI’s observations are not as frequent in time as the rest of the variables in the dataset. 
Accordingly, the variable is treated as follows. Figures from 2010 are used for observations between 2010 
and 2012, those from 2013 are used for observations between 2014 and 2016, and those from 2017 are 
used for that single year. This approach has an important drawback, as repeated values are assigned to 
several years. Accordingly, we implement alternative approaches to test for the sensitivity of the results. In 
particular, we provide results averaging data for the entire period (2010-2017) and for a two-period (2010-
2013; 2014-2017) panel structure. Finally, for regions in Belgium, Sweden and Slovenia, government 
quality is only reported for NUTS 1 units. Then, we assign these scores to the related NUTS 2 units.   
Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics for the EQI index. Large disparities are observed between 
EU-15 and NMS regions, with larger scores for the former group. Similarly, Figure 1 displays the cross-
section distribution of the index, both across groups of regions and over time, and shows a decline in 
government quality, more remarkable between 2010 and 2013.  The figure also shows that within-group 
heterogeneity is high. For example, in the EU-15 group we find regions from Italy, Greece and Spain on 
the left tail of the distribution, whereas on the right one we find regions from the Nordic countries, Austria 
and the Netherlands. The densities also suggest that convergence in government quality is not taking place, 
as their shape is highly persistent.8 
 
                                                            
6 The EU Regional Policy pays particular attention to the objective of convergence, which is addressed to the NUTS 2 level of 
disaggregation. 
7 Actually, the database provides these data on a 0-100 scale, but we rescaled the values to obtain larger and more easily readable 
coefficients in the econometric estimations. 
8 Apart from the shape of the densities, an in-depth analysis of convergence would also require the study of the intra-distribution 
dynamics, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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TABLE 1. 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
 
FIGURE 1. 
Kernel densities for government quality (EQI index) 
 





















 Average values 2010-2017 
 GDP pc (PPS €) GDP pc growth (%) 
EQI index 
(0-1) 
 Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. 
EU-28 26,134 9,967 0.025 0.014 0.561 0.202 
EU-15 29,195 8,861 0.020 0.012 0.638 0.172 
NMS 18,132 8,125 0.039 0.011 0.360 0.123 
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The dataset provides disaggregated information for the three components of the EQI index: quality, 
impartiality and corruption. Table 2 reports information for these indicators for years 2010, 2013 and 
2017. Similarly to what is found for the aggregated index, a decline is observable between 2010 and 2013. 
In contrast, in 2017 impartiality and quality improved, while corruption levels worsened even more for 
the EU-15 group. In the NMS group corruption remained relatively stable. Considering the entire sample 
(EU-28), the components of quality, impartiality and corruption declined by 10.6%, 10.2% and 14%, 
respectively, between 2010 and 2017.9  
TABLE 2. 
Evolution of the government quality components 
 Quality Impartiality Corruption 
 2010 2013 2017 2010 2013 2017 2010 2013 2017 
EU-28 0.655 0.529 0.585 0.637 0.556 0.572 0.605 0.555 0.520 
EU-15 0.713 0.579 0.639 0.704 0.602 0.624 0.673 0.616 0.568 
NMS 0.472 0.375 0.413 0.439 0.406 0.408 0.402 0.364 0.367 
 
As control variables we include the classical Solow variables, extensively used in the growth literature. 
We followed the seminal contributions by Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) and also more recent studies 
such as Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014), focused on the European context. The use of the Solow framework 
and Barro-type growth equations as a starting point when evaluating other theories in growth empirics is 
today widely supported (e.g. Durlauf et al. 2008; Henderson et al. 2012).10 
Our first control is the initial level of GDP per capita, in our case year 2010. A negative coefficient 
would imply that conditional convergence is taking place, i.e. subject to other regional fundamentals, 
poorer regions grow faster than the richer ones. The rest of controls include the annual R&D investments 
as share of GDP, treated as a proxy of technological progress. Labor and physical capital are included into 
the model through the regional population growth rate and the gross fixed capital formation (share of 
GDP), respectively. Moreover, as a proxy of human capital, the percentage of highly educated workers 
(tertiary education) is also considered (see Dettori et al. 2012). Data for all these controls are provided by 
Eurostat. Finally, following Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014), qualitative features are also controlled for by 
means of two dummy variables. The variable “NMS” takes the value of 1 if the region belongs to the NMS 
group and 0 otherwise, while the variable “capital city” takes the value of 1 when a region hosts the 
country’s capital city within its borders and 0 otherwise. Capital cities are generally a suitable environment 
for companies’ economic activities because of urban agglomeration and economic dynamism. Therefore, 
this qualitative characteristic is expected to have a positive role in explaining regional growth.   
4. Econometric strategy 
We estimate several model specifications, differing in the controls included. In some models, we also 
include interactions between government quality and the dummy variable NMS in order to study whether 
different impacts are found between groups. The most general model takes the form: 
yit = α + βQoGit + γXit + 𝜐𝜐𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀it     (1) 
where the subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 represent a given region and year, respectively, 𝑦𝑦 is regional output per capita 
growth, QoG represents either government quality or each of its three components, X is a vector of control 
                                                            
9 Note that for the case of corruption greater values mean lower corruption. 
10 It is noteworthy to underline that as Durlauf and Quah (1999) argued, the fact that one particular theory could predict economic 
growth does not discredit other alternative theories as growth drivers. Thus, different baseline models could have been implemented 
(see also Henderson et al. 2012). 
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variables and 𝜐𝜐 stands for time effects. Finally, α,β,  and γ are the model parameters and 𝜀𝜀 is the error 
term. The models are first estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Additionally, we consider several strategies to control for spatial spillovers. Given that the presence 
of unattended spatial spillovers in the data might produce non-robust estimates, testing for the existence 
of spatial dependence in our models is highly advisable. First, we run the Pesaran’s (2004) test, which 
assesses in a panel data context the cross-sectional dependence of the residuals in the OLS models. After 
verifying this is actually the case (the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is rejected in all 
cases), we model the spatial effects by means of specific spatial models. Following Elhorst (2010) and 
LeSage and Pace (2009) we first run a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), able to control for spatial spillovers 
in both the dependent and the independent variables. Formally: 
yit = α + ρWyjt + βQoGit + ηWQoGjt + γXit + δWXjt + 𝜐𝜐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀it  (2) 
where 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 are two given regions, 𝜌𝜌, η and 𝛿𝛿 are the spatial parameters and 𝑊𝑊 is a matrix of spatial 
weights describing the neighboring relationship between regions. The rest of elements are common to 
Equation (1). To construct the 𝑊𝑊 matrix, the inverse distance is first computed between all 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 pairs. Then, 
the 𝑘𝑘-nearest neighbor criterion is followed, which considers the 𝑘𝑘 closest regions to the geographical unit 
of interest as its neighbors. Although all the criteria to define the 𝑊𝑊 matrix are debatable, growth 
determinants in the European regional context are not particularly affected by different specifications of 
the neighbor matrix. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014) found analogous results using both distance-based 
and contiguity matrices, highlighting that the latter might capture regional spillovers appropriately. Also, 
LeSage (2014) postulated in favor of contiguity matrices, claiming the importance of setting a cut-off 
distance beyond which weights are zero and arguing that results from spatial models are relatively robust 
to changes in 𝑊𝑊. Following these arguments, pairs of neighbors in 𝑊𝑊 are represented by ones, while the 
rest of pairs take the value of zero. Moreover, following the standard convention, we row-normalize 𝑊𝑊 
such that its rows sum one. Accordingly, elements in 𝑊𝑊 are defined as follows: 
 
• 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘) = 0            𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗 
• 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘) = 0           𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 ∉ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖)𝑘𝑘 
• 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘) = 1/𝑘𝑘      𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖)𝑘𝑘 
 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 stands for the specific spatial link between regions 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖)𝑘𝑘 refers to the neighborhood 
of region 𝑖𝑖 for a given 𝑘𝑘. Given that EU NUTS 2 regions have generally from three to seven contiguous 
regions, we set 𝑘𝑘 = 5 as a rule of neighboring.  
Following the general-to-specific strategy proposed by Elhorst (2010), it is advisable to test whether 
the more comprehensive SDM can be simplified into a Spatial Lag Model—also known as Spatial 
Autoregressive Model (SAR), with spatial spillovers only in the dependent variable, or into a Spatial Error 
Model (SEM), with the spatial autocorrelation embedded in the error term. Formally, the SAR and SEM 
models are represented by Equations 3 and 4, respectively: 
yit = α + ρWyjt + βQoGit + γXit + 𝜐𝜐𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀it     (3) 
yit = α + βQoGit + γXit + 𝜐𝜐𝑡𝑡 + uit,     uit = λWujt + νit   (4) 
where 𝜀𝜀, u and ν are disturbances and the parameters ρ and λ summarize the strength of the spatial 
dependence. Despite models involving global spillover processes such as the SDM and the SAR have been 
criticized in growth contexts (see Corrado and Fingleton, 2012; Halleck-Vega and Elhorst, 2015), the 
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literature is still inconclusive on this point.11 In fact, other authors including Ertur and Koch (2007), 
Fischer (2011), D’agostino and Scarlato (2015) or Fiaschi et al. (2018) argue that these models can 
correctly capture technological and learning externalities, which are well-known growth drivers. Another 
example is Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014), who based their analysis of growth determinants for the 
European regions on SAR estimations. All the spatial models are estimated via Maximum Likelihood 
(MLE). 
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline estimations 
According to the theoretical arguments, we expect positive coefficients for government quality 
(North, 1990), education and R&D investment (Dettori et al. 2012) and the dummies for capital city and 
NMS group (Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2014). It is more difficult to forecast the sign for physical capital 
investment, as it can be generally more effective in developing economies. In our sample, despite the 
income heterogeneity, all regions are relatively developed (see Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2014). Finally, in 
accordance with the theory of beta convergence, the initial level of regional income per capita is expected 
to exert a negative impact on the dependent variable. The same sign is expected for population growth. 
Models 1 to 7 in Table 3 combine fixed and random effects estimations with different control 
variables. Although quality of government is not significantly associated to growth in Models 1 to 3, once 
important control variables such as R&D investment, capital city and especially the dummy variable NMS 
are included, its coefficient adopts the expected positive and significant effect. One potential explanation 
is that the different levels of quality of government and growth rates between former and new EU members 
may mask the effect of quality of government when the dummy variable is omitted.  
Model 6 incorporates the interaction between government quality and the NMS dummy. A negative 
sign is obtained and, accordingly, government quality has a larger effect on growth in EU-15 regions. As 
NMS regions grew faster despite their comparatively lower government quality and the main effect for 
government quality remains positive—in fact this is the model yielding the largest coefficient—NMS 
regions are losing an important growth potential.12 In other words, both their comparatively lower 
government quality and the lower capacity of their institutions to generate growth are slowing down their 
catching-up process with the EU-15. Given the interest of the European policymakers in reaching conver-
gence, this has implications for the design of future policies. Despite the new members are slowly catching-
up, there is a long way until they could reach the GDP per capita levels of the former EU-15 group. 
Strengthen the quality of their institutions could be an appropriate strategy to reduce the gap but, unfor-
tunately, what we are actually witnessing is a general decline of government quality across the entire EU-
28 in recent years. 
Regarding the control variables, the initial level of income per capita is negative only when the NMS 
dummy is not included. Logically, when this variable is added, it captures the effect of the initial GDP, as 
the NMS coefficient is clearly positive (note that NMS regions have lower initial income levels). 
Population growth is negative in all cases, in line with the previous literature. More controversial are the 
results found for education, generally non-significant across models. In contrast, R&D investment exhibits 
a positive sign in all of them. We argue that this latter variable can be partially absorbing the effect of 
education, as they are positively correlated—higher R&D efforts take place in regions with more qualified 
                                                            
11 In particular, one of the main shortcomings of SAR models is the imposition of the same proportional link between direct and 
indirect effects for all the regressors in the model. 
12 Similar results for NMS regions are found by Peiró-Palomino (2016) for the case of informal institutions (i.e. social capital). In 
particular, the author found a comparatively lower effect (in some cases even negative) of social capital on regional growth for NMS 
regions during the first years after the transition from the planned to the free market economy.  
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labor force. The effect of physical capital investment is non-significant, indicating that growth in the 
analyzed period is more driven by knowledge and institutional factors than by physical investment. 
Finally, in Model 7 we run a fixed effects estimation with all the controls. Unfortunately, this 
procedure removes all the time invariant variables, including the dummy variable for NMS regions, in 
which we are interested. When comparing fixed and random models with the Hausman test, we are unable 
to compare the models including the time invariant controls. The test was performed for Model 4 and for 
that specification the fixed effects alternative was preferable. However, few clear insights can be obtained 
from the fixed effects estimation in Model 7, as only population growth remains significant, which are 
results difficult to reconcile with the well-stablished growth theory. In addition, as the NMS dummy 
becomes part of the fixed effects, we cannot test whether different impacts are found for these regions, as 
we do in Model 6. If the predominant source of variation is cross-regional instead of within-regional, 
which is our case, fixed effects estimations can be troublesome and produce inaccurate results (Barro, 2000; 
Partridge, 2005). The cross-regional variation of the EQI index is notably larger than that within-
regional,13 thus explaining in a large extent the puzzling results from the fixed effects models. In contrast, 
random effects models perform similarly to OLS cross-sectional models. 
Given the particularities of our data, we prefer the random effects alternative for the subsequent 
analyses, even at the cost of assuming that, once initial GDP per capita and NMS are included in the 
model, the explanatory variables are not systematically correlated with the error term. Of course, this is 
debatable, but we consider ours as a balanced strategy given the counterintuitive results from the fixed 
effect models. Finally, Table 4 contains separate results for the three components of government quality 
using the most comprehensive specification and random effects estimations. The results suggest that all 
three components are positive and significant. In addition, their interaction with the dummy NMS is 
negative, in line with the results found for the aggregated indicator in Table 3. This corroborates the 
comparatively lower impact of government quality on growth in NMS regions. 
  
                                                            
13 Note that we were forced to assign the same values to several years due to availability constraints, increasing the stability. 
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TABLE 3.  
Government quality and GDP per capita growth 
GDP pc growth (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
Intercept 0.186 *** 0.054 ** 0.140 *** 0.199 *** 0.024  0.012  0.115 *** 
  (0.027)  (0.011)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.021)  
Initial GDP pc (logs) -0.015 ***   -0.011 *** -0.017 *** -0.000  0.000    
  (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)    
Government quality  0.003   -0.029  0.001  0.010 * 0.018 *** 0.025 *** -0.042  
 (0.005)  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.018)  
Population growth     -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** 
     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Education     0.026 ** -0.000  0.005  0.000  -0.049  
     (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.049)  
Physical capital     0.011  0.017  -0.016  -0.019  -0.144  
     (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.060)  
R&D investment       0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** -0.005  
       (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  
Capital city       0.012 *** 0.000  0.000    
       (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)    
NMS         0.023 *** 0.039 ***   
         (0.003)  (0.006)    
Government quality x 
NMS 
          -0.037 ***   
           (0.013)    
RE / FE RE  FE  RE  RE  RE  RE  FE  
N 1,648  1,648  1,648  1,648  1,648  1,648  1,648  
R2      0.242  0.204  0.270  0.285  0.324  0.329  0.126  
Joint significance 1,162.41 *** 106.12 *** 1,287.32 *** 1,273.03 *** 1,717.28 *** 1,622.10 *** 89.94 *** 
All the models include but do not report time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 4. 
Government quality components and GDP per capita growth 
GDP pc growth         (1)         (2)           (3)         (4)          (5)          (6)  
Intercept 0.020  0.012  0.024  0.007  0.022  0.023  
  (0.038)   (0.037)   (0.037)   (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.035)  
Initial GDP pc (logs) -0.006  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
  (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Population growth -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Quality 0.012 * 0.024 ***         
 (0.006)  (0.006)          
Impartiality     0.017 *** 0.030 ***     
     (0.006)  (0.006)      
Corruption         0.020 *** 0.029 *** 
         (0.006)  (0.005)  
Education 0.012  0.005  0.009  -0.000  0.005  -0.001  
 (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Physical capital -0.018  -0.021  -0.016  -0.018  -0.015  -0.023  
 (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.019)  
R&D investment 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Capital city -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
NMS 0.022 *** 0.039 *** 0.022 *** 0.044 *** 0.023 *** 0.042 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  
Quality x NMS   -0.036 ***         
   (0.010)          
Impartiality x NMS       -0.044 ***     
       (0.011)      
Corruption x NMS           -0.043 *** 
           (0.012)  
N 1,624  1,624  1,624  1,624  1,624  1,624  
R2      0.320  0.328  0.324  0.332  0.326  0.334  
Joint significance 1,670.63 *** 1,655.83 *** 1,655.83 *** 1568,83 *** 1,664.20 *** 1,571.48 *** 
All the models are random effects estimations and include but do not report time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively.
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5.2. Spatial spillovers 
This section details the results from the spatial models, reported in Table 5. As explained in Section 
4, the neighboring W matrix was specified using the k-nearest neighbor criterion, setting k=5. The 
Pesaran’s (2004) tests (available at the bottom of the table) point to the existence of spatial dependence in 
the residuals of the non-spatial (OLS) estimations. After detecting the spatial autocorrelation, we estimate 
SDM models. As argued by LeSage and Pace (2009), SDM can provide unbiased estimates even if the true 
model is a SEM or a SAR.14 Therefore, it is a wise starting point.  
TABLE 5. 
SAR estimations for government quality and GDP per capita growth 
GDP pc growth (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 0.000  -0.002  0.000  -0.002  
  (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.032)  
Initial GDP pc (logs) 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)  
Government quality      0.014  ***                         
 (0.005)        
Quality   0.000      
   (0.005)      
Impartiality     0.013 ***   
     (0.002)    
Corruption       0.014 *** 
       (0.005)  
Population growth -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Education -0.002  0.002  0.005  -0.001  
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Physical capital -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
R&D investment 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Capital city 0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
NMS 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.014 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
N 1,648  1,624  1,624  1,624  
Pesaran test in OLS 
model 
144.42 *** 141.88 *** 142.29 *** 142.61 *** 
LR-test (SAR vs. 
SDM) 
10.57  11.26  10.84  10.71  
LR-test (SEM vs. 
SDM) 
17.96 ** 18.58 ** 18.59 ** 18.00  ** 
Rho 0.468 *** 0.469 *** 0.468 *** 0.466 *** 
R2      0.327      0.319      0.322      0.325  
Log-pseudolikelihood 3,811.87  3,748.68  3,750.80  3,751.61  
All the models are random effects estimations and include but do not report time effects. k-nearest neighbors, k=5. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
                                                            
14 See LeSage and Pace (2009) for the technical demonstration. 
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However, it is also advisable to test whether the SDM can be simplified into a SEM or a SAR 
(Elhorst, 2010). Then, we perform likelihood ratio tests (LR-tests, also available at the bottom of Table 
5). The results indicate that the SAR model cannot be rejected in front of the SDM, while the SEM is 
rejected in all cases. We therefore report the SAR models in Table 5, as this is the preferred specification.  
We find positive estimated coefficients for government quality. When focusing on the individual 
components, positive effects are found for impartiality and corruption, whereas a non-significant coeffi-
cient is obtained for the quality component. Analogously, the rest of the explanatory variables also disclose 
consistent coefficients with the results previously discussed. The average spatial autocorrelation is 
summarized by the Rho coefficient, around 0.46 in all the models and indicating a highly positive spatial 
autocorrelation.  
In order to interpret the coefficients from the SAR model, direct and indirect impacts need to be 
computed, as these models generate spatial spillovers (see, for technical details LeSage and Pace, 2009). 
Then, changes in government quality in one region not only affect growth in that region, but also growth 
in its neighbors. Finally, the growth of the neighbors will have a positive feedback effect on the region 
where initially the variation in government quality took place, giving rise to the direct effect. In contrast, 
the indirect effect is the average impact of changes in government quality in one region on its neighbors’ 
growth. The results are reported in Table 6. Interestingly, whereas the components of impartiality and 
corruption exhibit very similar impacts to those for the aggregated index, the effects for the quality 
component are non-significant. In terms of size, we find that the indirect effects are almost as large as the 
direct ones, indicating that the spatial spillovers play a remarkable role and should be taken into account. 
The total effects are the sum of both direct and indirect impacts. 
TABLE 6.  
Direct, indirect and total effects of government quality on GDP per capita growth  
 SAR models (k=5) 





Government quality 0.014 ** 0.011  ** 0.026 ** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.011)  
Quality 0.009  0.007   0.017  
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  
Impartiality 0.014 ** 0.011  ** 0.025 ** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.010)  
Corruption 0.015 *** 0.012 ** 0.027 ** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010)  
Effects are computed departing from the estimates from Models 1 - 4 in Table 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
5.3. Robustness tests 
Different techniques are employed to check for the robustness of the results. First, given that we 
used repeated figures of quality of government for the intermediate years, we replicate the main models 
for different time periods. Table A1 in the Appendix A provides the results. In the table, columns (1) to 
(5) correspond to a cross-sectional framework, in which we average all the available information for the 
period 2010-2017. Columns (6) to (10) contain the results of a two-period panel data estimation. The 
first period averages all the time-varying information of years 2010-2013 and uses government quality 
data from 2010. The second period averages the time-varying data of years 2014-2017, while government 
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quality is the average of the two available figures for that period, namely 2013 and 2017. The results are 
in all cases in line with the baseline estimations of Tables 3 and 4, both in terms of size of the coefficients 
and significance levels. 
Second, with respect to the spatial analysis, the regressions are performed using different neighboring 
criteria, namely k=3 and k=7, that is, considering as neighbors the three and seven nearest regions, respec-
tively. The results are reported in Table A2 of the Appendix A and are qualitatively analogous to those 
obtained with k=5. The quality component is non-significant or only weakly significant, whereas positive 
and significant coefficients, almost identical in size regardless of the matrix used, are found for impartiality 
and corruption. 
6. Concluding remarks and policy prescriptions 
This paper has assessed the role of government quality on European regional growth for the period 
2010-2017. The findings largely support North’s (1990) proposition according to which institutions drive 
economic performance, hence resulting as a valuable tool for achieving regional progress. In the framework 
of the European Regional Policy, this means that government quality should become an important tool to 
achieve regional convergence. Our analysis has shown that regions from the new EU members (NMS) 
have remarkably lower levels of government quality than the former EU-15 economies. Consequently, 
although the new members are growing comparatively faster, their low-quality institutions are decelerating 
the catching-up process. We argue that institutions need some time to improve. The NMS economies 
have completed the transition from a planned to a free market economy but, it is possible that their insti-
tutional frameworks have still reminiscences from the burdensome and inefficient institutional apparatus 
of the communist system.  
Our results point to a positive role of government quality on economic growth, which is coherent 
with the previous findings by Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015), Crescenzi et al. (2016) and Ketterer 
and Rodríguez-Pose (2018). With respect to the previous literature, we provide results for a more recent 
period of time. Also, we used richer information, as we considered the three available editions of the EQI 
index (2010, 2013 and 2017), analyzed individual components, and quantified spatial spillovers.  
The data show a decline in government quality across all the EU-28, similar in size in both the EU-
15 and the NMS groups. Then, the institutional distance between the two groups remained relatively 
stable over the studied period. Accordingly, policy efforts should be addressed to improve government 
quality all across the Union, with special emphasis in narrowing the gap between former and new members. 
In addition, the results from the spatial panel approach reveal the existence of positive feedback effects, 
implying the presence of virtuous reciprocal influences between neighbor regions. The results for govern-
ment components provide additional clues on where policies should put the effort. In particular, once 
spatial spillovers are considered, having highly impartial and corruption-free institutions are those elements 
more directly related to growth. In contrast, a weaker or even a non-significant effect is found for the 
quality of government services. 
In the light of our findings, some policy advices aimed at improving regional economic performance 
through government quality are presented. For instance, Alesina (2003) suggested that subnational 
administrations exerting their powers in smaller territories generally have to deal with less heterogeneous 
individual preferences. This feature would allow local governments to supply public policies that are closer 
to residents’ preferences and increase their efficiency. Then, government reforms aimed at decentralizing 
the executive power and at establishing a clearer separation of the duties between central and subnational 
governments should be encouraged.   
Other authors such as Padovano and Ricciuti (2009) found that higher competitiveness in the 
political arena improves the quality of local institutions. Thus, measures aimed at increasing democratic 
competitiveness and alternation between political forces, such as setting limits to the mandates of regional 
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governors might be considered as well. This could help in improving the impartiality and the corruption 
components. All in all, institutions should be considered not always as a provider, but also as the object of 
public policies. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the paper has also some limitations. One derives from the 
nature of the data on government quality, for which yearly information is not available. We attempted to 
address this issue by artificially assigning repeated values to intermediate years or averaging the data for 
different periods. Despite we obtain very similar results when using different temporal aggregations, results 
should be taken cautiously. Another important limitation is the potential existence of endogeneity, which 
is not treated in the paper and might be a promising avenue for future research. 
References 
Acemoglu, D; Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long–run 
growth. In P. Aghion, & S. Durlauf, Handbook of Economic Growth. North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Alesina, A. (2003). The size of countries: does it matter? Journal of the European Economic Association, 
1(2), 301-316. 
Barro, R. (1991). Economic growth in a cross section of countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106(2), 407-443. 
Barro, R. (2000) Inequality and growth in a panel of countries, Journal Economic Growth 5, 5–32. 
Basyal, D.K., Poudyal, N. and Seo, J.W. (2018). Does E‐government reduce corruption? Evidence from 
a heterogeneous panel data model, Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 12 
(2),134‐154. 
Bologna, J; Young, A.T. and Lacombe, D.J. (2016). A spatial analysis of incomes and institutional quality: 
evidence from US metropolitan areas. Journal of Institutional Economics, 12 (1), 191-216. 
Charron, N; Dijkstra, L. and Lapuente, V. (2014). Regional governance matters: Quality of government 
within European Union Member States. Regional Studies, 48(1), 68-90. 
Charron, N., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein,B., Khomenko, A. & Svensson, R. (2016). The 
Quality of Government EU Regional Dataset, version Sep16. University of Gothenburg: The 
Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Charron, N., Lapuente, V. and Annoni, P. (2019). Measuring quality of government in EU regions across 
space and time. Papers in Regional Science, forthcoming. 
Choi, J.W. (2018). Corruption control and prevention in the Korean government: Achievements and 
challenges from an institutional perspective, Asian Education and Development Studies, 7 (3), 303‐
314. 
 
Coppola, G., Destefanis, S., Marinuzzi, G. and Tortorella, W. (2018). European Union and nationally 
based cohesion policies in the Italian regions. Regional Studies, forthcoming. 
Corrado, L. and Flingleton, B. (2012): Where is the Economics in Spatial Econometrics? Journal of 
Regional Science, 52, 210-239. 
Crescenzi, R; Di Cataldo, M. and Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2016). Government quality and the economic 
returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions. Journal of Regional Science, 
56(4), 555-582. 
Crespo-Cuaresma J; Doppelhofer G. and Feldkircher M. (2014). The determinants of economic growth 
in European regions. Regional Studies, 48(1), 44-67. 
Government quality and regional growth in the enlarged European Union: Components, evolution…   33 
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 45 (2019/3), 17-37              ISSN: 1695-7253  e-ISSN: 2340-2717 
D'agostino, G. and Scarlato, M. (2015). Innovation, socio-institutional conditions and economic growth 
in the Italian regions. Regional Studies, 49(5), 555-582. 
de Haan, J. and Sturm, J.E. (2000). On the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 16(2), 215-241. 
Dettori B; Marrocu, E. and Paci, R.R. (2012). Total factor productivity, intangible assets and spatial 
dependence in the European regions. Regional Studies, 46(10), 1401-1416. 
Di Berardino, C., D'Ingiullo, D., Quaglione, D. and Sarra, A. (2019). Migration and institutional quality 
across Italian provinces: The role of human capital. Papers in Regional Science, 98: 843–860. 
Durlauf, S.N. and Quah, D.T. (1999). The new empirics of economic growth. In U. Taylor, Handbook 
of Macroeconomics. North Holland. 
Durlauf, S.N; Kourtellos, A. and Ming Tan, C. (2008). Are any growth theories robust? The Economic 
Journal, 118(527), 329-346. 
Edquist, C. (1997). Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions, and Organizations. London: 
Cassell Academic. 
Elhorst, J.P. (2010), Applied Spatial Econometrics: Raising the Bar, Spatial Economic Analysis, 5, 1, 9-
28. 
European Commission. (2017). Seventh Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion. 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
Ertur, C. and Koch, W. (2007). Growth, technological interdependence and spatial externalities: Theory 
and evidence. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22, 6, 1033-1062. 
Ezcurra, R. and Rios, V. (2019). Quality of government and regional resilience in the European Union. 
Evidence from the Great Recession. Papers in Regional Science, forthcoming. 
Fiaschi, D., Lavezzi, A. M. and Parenti, A. (2018). Does EU cohesion policy work? Theory and evidence. 
Journal of Regional Science , 58 (2), 386-423. 
Fischer, M. M. (2011): A spatial Mankiw-Romer-Weil model: theory and evidence. The Annals of 
Regional Science, 47, 2, 419-436. 
Gupta, S; Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and 
poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23-45. 
Gwartney, J. D; Lawson, R. and Holcombe R. G. (1999). Economic freedom and the environment for 
economic growth. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155(4), 643-663. 
Halleck-Vega, S. and Elhorst, J.P. (2015). The SLX Model. Journal of Regional Science, 55, (3), 339-
363. 
Henderson, D. J., Papageorgiou, C., and Parmeter, C. F. (2012). Growth empirics without parameters. 
Economic Journal 122(559):125–154. 
Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Nasiritousi, N., (2009). Quality of government: What you get. Annual 
Review of Political Science 12, 135-161. 
Holmberg, S. and Rothstein, B. (2012). Good Government: the Relevance of Political Sciences. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Ketterer, T.D. and Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2018). Institutions vs. ‘first-nature’ geography: What drives 
economic growth in Europe’s regions? Papers in Regional Science, 97 (S1), 25-62. 
Knack, S., Keefer, P., (1995). Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using 
alternative institutional measures. Economics & Politics 7(3), 207-227. 
34   Peiró-Palomino, J. 
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 45 (2019/3), 17-37              ISSN: 1695-7253  e-ISSN: 2340-2717 
LeSage, J.P. (2014). What regional scientists need to know about spatial econometrics, The Review of 
Regional Studies, 44, 13-32. 
LeSage, J.P. and Pace, R.K. (2009). An introduction to Spatial Econometrics. Chapman and Hall/CRC. 
New York. 
Lasagni, A; Nifo, A. and Vecchione, G. (2015). Firm productivity and institutional quality: evidence from 
Italian industry. Journal of Regional Science, 55(5), 774-800. 
Lucas, R. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 22(1), 
3-42. 
Lundstrom, S. (2005). The effect of democracy on differente categories of economic freedom. European 
Journal of Political Economy, 21(4), 967-980. 
Mankiw, G; Romer, D. and David, N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407-437. 
Mo P.H., (2001). Corruption and economic growth. Journal of Public Economics 29, 66–79. 
Nistotskaya, M; Charron, N. and Lapuente, V. (2015). The wealth of regions: quality of government and 
SMEs in European regions. Evironment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 33(5), 1125-
1155. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Partridge, M. D. (2005). Does income distribution affect U.S. state economic growth?, Journal of 
Regional Science, 45(2), 363–394. 
Padovano, F. and Ricciuti, R. (2009). Political competition and economic performance: evidences from 
Italian provinces. Public Choice, 138(3), pp. 263-277. 
Peiró-Palomino, J. (2016). Social capital and economic growth in Europe: nonlinear trends and 
heterogeneous regional effects, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 78 (5), 717-751 
Pesaran, M.H. (2004). General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 1240  
Quah, J.S.T. (2017). Learning from Singapore’s effective anti‐corruption strategy: Policy 
recommendations for South Korea, Asian Education and Development Studies, 6 (1), 17‐29. 
Rodrick, D; Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over 
geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2),131-165. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013). Do institutions matter for regional economic development? Regional Studies, 
47(7), 1034-1047. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Di Cataldo, M. (2014). Quality of government and innovative performance in 
the regions of Europe. Journal of Economic Geography, 15(4), 673-706. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Garcilazo, E. (2015). Quality of government and returns of investments: 
Examining the impact of cohesion expenditure in European regions. Regional Studies, 49(8), 1274-
1290. 
Romer, P. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy, 94(5), 1002-
1037. 
Solow, R. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
70(1), 65-94. 
Government quality and regional growth in the enlarged European Union: Components, evolution…   35 
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 45 (2019/3), 17-37              ISSN: 1695-7253  e-ISSN: 2340-2717 
Veenhoven, R. (2010). How universal is happiness? In E. Diener, J. Helliwell, & D. Kahneman, 
International Differences in Well-being. Oxford University Press. 
Welsch, H. (2004). Corruption, growth and environment: A cross-country analysis. Environment and 
Development Economics, 9(5), 663-693. 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project ECO2017-85746-




36   Peiró-Palomino, J. 
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 45 (2019/3), 17-37                                                                                                                                              ISSN: 1695-7253  e-ISSN: 2340-2717 
Appendix A. Robustness tests 
TABLE A1. 
Results for different periods 
 Cross-section 2010-2017 Panel data 2010-2013 and 2014-2017 
GDP pc growth                   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)         (8)  (9)  (10)  
Intercept 0.058 * 0.053  0.057  0.052  0.056 * 0.027  0.024  0.026  0.020  0.017  
 (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.035)  
Initial GDPpc (logs) -0.007 * -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.003  -0.002  -0.003 * -0.002 * -0.002  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Government quality 0.025 ***       0.033 *** 0.022 ***       0.029 *** 
 (0.006)        (0.006)  (0.005)        (0.006)  
Quality   0.019 ***         0.017 ***       
   (0.007)          (0.006)        
Impartiality     0.025 ***         0.022 ***     
     (0.006)          (0.005)      
Corruption       0.026 ***         0.022 ***   
       (0.007)          (0.006)    
Population growth -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.007 ** -0.005 ** -0.002  -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.004 ** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Education 0.001  0.010  0.006  0.001  -0.008  0.003  0.010  0.007  0.005  -0.001  
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
Physical capital 0.049 * 0.050 * 0.048 * 0.052 ** 0.040 * 0.016  0.017  0.016  0.018  0.008  
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.019)  
R&D investment 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Capital city 0.004  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
NMS 0.021 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.040 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.039 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  
Government quality x NMS         -0.046 ***         -0.038 *** 
         (0.015)          (0.013)  
N 206  203  203  203  206  412  406  406  406  412  
R2 0.481  0.456  0.481  0.489  0.509  0.300  0.288  0.300  0.300  0.316  
Joint significance 22.14 *** 19.59 *** 20.82 *** 19.96 *** 24.73 *** 230.41 *** 210.36 *** 226.31 *** 213.97 *** 259.17 *** 
Columns (1) to (5) correspond to a cross-section analysis averaging all the available data in the period 2010-2017. Columns (6) to (10) correspond to a two-period panel analysis, averaging 
the available data for periods (2010-2013) and (2014-2017). Panel data models are random effects estimations and include but do not report time effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
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TABLE A2. 
SAR estimations with alternative specifications of the spatial matrix (k=3 and k=7) 
All the models are random effects estimations and include but do not report time effects and control variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 
1% significant levels, respectively. 
 
 
GDP pc growth Panel data SAR models 
Intercept 0.005  -0.001  0.000  -0.004  0.003  -0.008  0.000  -0.003  
  (0.033)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.035)   (0.033)   (0.034)   (0.032)  (0.032)  
Government quality      0.014  ***      0.014  **                                           
 (0.005)  (0.005)              
Quality     0.009  0.009 *         
     (0.006)  (0.005)          
Impartiality         0.014 *** 0.014 ***     
         (0.005)  (0.005)      
Corruption             0.014 *** 0.014 *** 
             (0.005)  (0.005)  
LR-test (SAR vs. 
SDM) 
6.61  11.01  8.90  10.48  8.83  10.11  8.41  9.96  
K-nearest criterion k=3  k=7  k=3  k=7  k=3  k=7  k=3  k=7  
Rho 0.409 *** 0.510 *** 0.410 *** 0.515 *** 0.409 *** 0.514 *** 0.407 *** 0.512 *** 
N 1,648  1,648  1,624  1,624  1,624  1,624  1,624  1,624  
R2      0.327  0.316      0.323  0.315      0.326  0.317      0.329  0.319  
Log-pseudolikelihood 3,810.65         3,811.21  3,747.59         3,749.95  3,749.96         3,752.12  3,750.39         3,752.91  
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